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Measuring Party System Concentration  
Including the Cabinet Level 
Eric Linhart & Johannes Raabe ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Messung der Konzentration von Parteiensystemen unter Berück-
sichtigung möglicher Regierungsbildungen«. Accurate evaluation of electoral 
systems requires precise measurement of both the disproportionality and the 
concentration of party systems. While the measurement of disproportionality 
has been investigated systematically and clear guidance for measurement ex-
ists, such treatment is lacking for the concentration dimension. This paper clari-
fies the theoretical concept of concentration in focusing on the directness of 
the voter-government link and differences between types of coalitions. In light 
of this concept, a new measure is introduced, and the different measures are 
compared theoretically as well as empirically. In conclusion, the effective num-
ber of parties measure provides a fruitful framework, but should be applied to 
the cabinet instead of the parliament level in order to clearly identify substan-
tial features of party system concentration. 
Keywords: Party system, concentration, fragmentation, effective number of 
parties, electoral systems.  
1.   Introduction 
When assessing party systems with respect to the performance of electoral 
systems, researchers are usually concerned with two key dimensions: the 
(dis)proportionality of the seat distribution relative to the vote distribution and 
the concentration of the ensuing party system. The first dimension addresses 
the question of whether the parliament accurately, i.e. proportionally, reflects 
different voter groups. At its core, the latter examines the type of government 
                                                             
∗  Eric Linhart, Chemnitz University of Technology, Thüringer Weg 9, 09111 Chemnitz,  
Germany; eric.linhart@phil.tu-chemnitz.de. 
 Johannes Raabe, University of Kiel, Westring 400, 24098 Kiel, Germany; 
johannes.raabe@gmx.de. 
 Acknowledgements: This paper has been written in the context of the research project “The 
Comparison of Electoral Systems’ Functions with a Special Focus on Mixed Systems” (Grant 
Number LI 1656/4-1). We are grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for sup-
port. A former version of this paper has been presented at the 11th ECPR General Confer-
ence in Oslo. We thank the participants of the panel “Game-Theoretic Approaches in Politi-
cal Science,” in particular Dominik Klein and Johannes Marx, for valuable suggestions. 
Finally, we are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for very fruitful comments. 
HSR 43 (2018) 2  │  254 
the election results lead to and whether there exists a direct link between voters’ 
choices and government formation (Farrell 2011; Lijphart and Grofman 1984; 
Nohlen 1984; Raabe and Linhart 2018). In the case of necessary coalition ne-
gotiations the direct link would be distorted and government accountability 
potentially weakened (Powell 2000). Depending on the coalition structure, this 
distortion can be minor or severe as we will discuss more broadly in section 2. 
When it comes to the evaluation of concrete electoral systems, we need ade-
quate measures, which allow for both the identification of polar scenarios and 
accurate distinctions between intermediate outcomes.  
While the measurement of the proportionality dimension is relatively 
straightforward and the differences between various indices have been dis-
cussed rigorously (see Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Monroe 1994; Taa-
gepera and Grofman 2003), the situation is different concerning the concentra-
tion dimension. While different measures have been proposed and while the 
merits of particular measures have been discussed (see, e.g., Golosov 2010; 
Taagepera 2007, 47-64), there is a critical gap still to be addressed: in particu-
lar with an eye on intermediate cases of concentration, we will show how exist-
ing measures struggle to clearly distinguish between different types of coalition 
governments which become feasible after an election – a seemingly crucial 
requirement for making nuanced judgments about intermediate cases of party 
system concentration. This paper seeks to tackle this problem by proposing a 
measurement approach that includes the cabinet level and takes differences 
between types of coalition governments into account. By subsequently subject-
ing this new approach and existing alternatives to a comprehensive, systematic 
comparison with regard to their aptitude to capture key developments of party 
system concentration, we seek to supply measurement advice. The key re-
quirement characterizing a good measure is considered to be performing well 
with regard to both the identification of polar and intermediate cases. 
Therefore, it is first necessary to clearly define the concept which we seek to 
measure, the concentration of a party system. The focus here lies on the direct-
ness of a voter-government link as a continuous phenomenon (section 2). We 
then introduce the different indices applied in order to measure party system 
concentration (section 3) and propose our new measurement approach (section 
4). In section 5, we discuss these different measures’ strengths and weaknesses 
in light of the theoretical concept and point out the indices’ characteristics with 
help of selected empirical illustrations. We conclude with a short summary and 
a discussion of implications (section 6). 
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2. The Concept of Party System Concentration – What 
Are We Trying to Measure? 
Before considering the measurement of the concept of party system concentra-
tion, we need to clearly map out what this concept entails (see Goertz 2008; 
Sartori 1970). Specifically, we focus on what this concept entails from the 
perspective of electoral system research since “how we count depends on 
where we look” (Blau 2008, 167). When the evaluation of an electoral system 
with respect to the concentration dimension is the task at hand, the central 
empirical question usually becomes whether or not a single party is able to 
obtain a majority of the parliamentary seats (Farrell 2011, 10-1). Yet, this em-
pirical question is tied to the more substantial question of whether there exists a 
direct link between the voters’ choices and government formation (Duverger 
1984). Based on such a direct link, so the argument goes, voters can hold the 
government accountable at the next election as they are able to assign responsi-
bility in a straightforward manner (e.g. Powell 2000; Powell and Whitten 
1993).1 Such a direct link is seen as a central benefit of two-party systems – 
typically emerging in majoritarian electoral systems – which usually produce 
single-party governments (Hellwig and Samuels 2008, 73). Consequently, its 
absence in cases where coalition bargaining becomes necessary has been criti-
cized as a drawback of multiparty systems, typically resulting under propor-
tional representation electoral rules (see Fisher and Hobolt 2010). What is 
central here is that the conceptual focus primarily lies on the cabinet level as 
opposed to the electoral and parliamentary levels (see also Blau 2008). While 
the seat distribution in the parliament obviously constrains government for-
mation, the structure of the resulting government and how it affects the voters’ 
ability to hold it accountable are clearly of central interest. 
Although the above discussion makes it seem that measurement of party 
system concentration in light of electoral system evaluation should be fairly 
straightforward by simply distinguishing between those constellations where 
one party holds a majority of the seats and all other cases, things are not that 
easy. Obviously, there are important differences between those ‘other’ cases 
where no single-party government ensues (see Mair 2002). Crucially, the con-
cept of party system concentration is not dichotomous but continuous (Rose 
1984). If there is no single-party majority, it is of substantial importance how 
close election outcomes get to the threshold of single-party majority and what 
types of coalitions are able to form the government. This also, if somewhat 
implicitly, includes minority coalitions where the governing party (or parties) 
require additional support from other parties to organize legislative majorities. 
                                                             
1  Of course, a plethora of (institutional) factors affect voters’ ability to hold governments 
accountable in practice (Hellwig and Samuels 2008). 
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The emphasis on the type of support needed is warranted because different 
types of coalitions imply different levels of directness of the voter-government 
link. Concerning the question of whether election outcomes clearly lead to 
government formation and how far voters are removed from the process of 
selecting who will be part of the government, it is of crucial importance wheth-
er one party receives close to 50 percent of the seats and forms the government 
alongside a small partner with the large party only being vulnerable to a large 
multiparty coalition – this was the case in the United Kingdom in 2010 where 
the Conservatives won 47.2 percent of the seats and in New Zealand in 2011 
where the National Party missed an absolute majority by just two seats – or 
whether no party receives such a clear mandate to govern. The latter is the case 
when there exist many coalition options, multiple of which excluding the 
strongest party (or even the two strongest parties as was the case in the Nether-
lands in 2010 and in Israel in 2013) from the government and subsequently 
force two or even multiple moderately to large sized parties to enter a coalition. 
Clearly, different sets of coalition options carry very different potential to heav-
ily distort the voter-government link via the stage of coalition formation. 
The continuous nature of the concept and the relevance of taking size distri-
butions into account when considering a government’s policy output are also 
highlighted by research on the accountability of different types of coalition 
governments. It is what Hobolt et al. (2013, 169) term “government clarity” 
based on the coalition structure that is crucial for the voters’ ability to assign 
responsibility. For example, a coalition between two large parties might make 
it very difficult for voters to assign responsibility, while a coalition of a large 
party with a considerably smaller partner, might impose fewer constraints on a 
voter’s ability to do so (see Banaszak and Doerschler 2012; Fisher and Hobolt 
2010, 360; Hobolt et al. 2013).2 Thus, while from an electoral system perspec-
tive reaching the threshold of single-party government in any case fulfills the 
requirement of a direct voter-government link, the absence of a single-party 
majority does not necessarily suggest the complete absence of said connection. 
The structure of the possible coalition governments and changes to this struc-
ture are therefore important to consider when assessing party system concentra-
tion. In sum, the concentration dimension is concerned with the set of govern-
ment options and the likely size structure of the ensuing government resulting 
                                                             
2  The fact that coalition governments might not fully distort a direct voter-government link is 
also highlighted by the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions (party blocs typically consist-
ing of a larger party and one or more smaller partners). Voters think of such bloc-coalitions 
as government options instead of singular parties and then are able to hold these coalitions 
accountable (Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Gallagher 2005, 562-3; Mair 2002, 106; Shugart 
2001, 25-6; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Studies of voting behaviour have recently 
shown that voters do take the structure of possible coalition governments into account 
when making their choice (e.g. Bytzek et al. 2012; Duch et al. 2010; Hobolt et al. 2013). 
HSR 43 (2018) 2  │  257 
from an election with single-party government as one “polar characteristic” 
(see Sartori 1976, 273, 315). 
What we seek to measure is thus not just whether but to which extent the 
voter-government link is a direct one. Furthermore, it is the structure of the 
government which we are ultimately concerned about. Thus, next to the con-
straining parliamentary seat distribution it is especially the concentration on the 
cabinet level which lies at the heart of what party system concentration implies. 
Concretely, an appropriate index for the measurement of party system concen-
tration with regard to government clarity has to fulfill three demands. First, it 
must clearly distinguish between the cases with completely undistorted voter-
government links (i.e. cases with single-party majorities) and the other cases. 
Second, it should indicate how strongly the voter-government link is distorted 
for the cases without single-party majorities. And third, it should not suggest 
variation when there is no substantial difference with regard to the concept. 
This implies in particular that all cases with fully undistorted voter-government 
links should be evaluated equally. 
3. Measuring Party System Concentration: An Overview 
of Existing Measures 
When it comes to the indices applied to measure the concentration dimension, 
these stem from a pool consisting of both indices initially devised to measure 
fragmentation as a more general characteristic of a party system as well as of 
indices devised for more specific purposes. In this section, we discuss the differ-
ent measures and the conceptual problems with regard to the concentration di-
mension which have sparked the development of respective alternatives. In the 
same spirit, we will later suggest a way of measuring concentration which comes 
closer to what the theoretical concept implies than existing measures by including 
the cabinet level in a nuanced fashion. 
The different approaches taken so far may be ordered roughly from those indi-
ces which focus solely on the parliamentary level to those which take the cabinet 
level (and therefore the majority threshold) into consideration. The most simple 
fragmentation measure counts the number of parties holding seats in the parlia-
ment, treating all parties as equals (N; e.g. Sartori 1976, 119-20). As this proce-
dure does not take into account the relative size of different parties, alternative 
measures of fragmentation were devised. Both Rae’s (1967) F and Laakso and 
Taagepera’s (1979) “effective number of parties” (from here on referred to as 
NLT) convey the exact same information about the fragmentation of a party sys-
tem (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 4). However, as NLT has the intuitive inter-
pretation of signaling to the researcher the “number of hypothetical equal-size 
parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as 
have the actual parties of unequal size” (Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 4), it quick-
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ly became the most widely used measure of party system fragmentation (Golosov 
2010, 173). NLT takes into consideration the relative size of the parties (via their 





It is already well-known that NLT fails to properly identify situations in which a 
single party holds a large amount of the seats while no other party is coming 
close to it (see Bogaards 2004; Molinar 1991; Pedersen 1980). As a response to 
the critique and based on previously proposed alternatives (Dunleavy and Boucek 
2003; Molinar 1991), Golosov (2010) has developed a closely related alternative 
to NLT: 
NG = ∑ sisi+ s1² - si²
N
i=1  , 
where s1 denotes the seat share of the largest party. The main difference with 
respect to NLT lies in the fact that in NG the largest party becomes the reference for 
the assessment of the relative size of all remaining parties. Thus how these latter 
parties impact the overall NG depends not only on their seat shares but important-
ly also on their relative seat shares compared to the largest party (Golosov 2010, 
183). Due to this computation, NG does not have quite an intuitive interpretation 
as NLT in that it provides a measure of the ‘effective’ number of parties with 
respect to the largest party which counts as one while smaller parties count as 
fractions of one based on their relative size compared to the largest party. 
Clearly focusing on the majority threshold, Taagepera (1999) has suggested 
considering only the largest party for an additional measure of party system con-
centration, supplementing NLT. Taagepera (1999, 502) tries to alleviate the prob-
lem that NLT typically fails to identify one-party-majorities by also reporting the 





This focus on the predominance of the largest party at least implicitly shifts the 
focus from the parliamentary to the cabinet level where the key question revolves 
around whether or not the largest party will be able to form a single-party gov-
ernment. 
The cabinet level and thus the concrete government options are explicitly in-
cluded in measures which are based directly on the decision rule of majority. 
Viewed in a dichotomous way, and hence largely neglecting the structure of the 
parliamentary seat distribution, the researcher could simply consider concentra-
tion to be present if there is a single-party majority (SPM) and to be absent if no 
single party holds a majority of the seats. Going beyond this simplistic perspec-
                                                             
3  Taagepera (1999) uses the inverse as it places s1-1 into a common mathematical framework 
with NLT. Obviously, the information is the same if one simply reports the share of the larg-
est party. Shugart (2001, 31-2) also provides a variant of this measure, capturing “majority 
approximation” by dividing the majority quota of 0.5 by the seat-share of the largest party 
and assigning the value 1 to all cases where the largest party holds a majority of the seats. 
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tive, an alternative is to consider the extent to which parties are relevant for gov-
ernment formation. Referring to the notion of the relevance of parties given their 
coalition viability (Sartori 1976, 122), several authors have suggested to use 
indices of voting power based on the (mathematical) coalition viability of parties 
in order to assess their relative weights (see Caulier and Dumont 2005; Grofman 
2006; Kline 2009; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 259). Based on work by Caulier 
and Dumont (2005) who suggest using the normalized Banzhaf index of voting 





Focusing not only on the largest party but on all parties which are viable for 
coalition government (by being a swing voter in at least one winning coalition) 
means taking the majority threshold fully into account. This then pairs the 
identification of single-party majorities with additional information, especially 
including stronger consideration of small-sized but pivotal parties (see Sartori 
1994, 35). 
4. Shifting the Focus to the Cabinet Level: A Modified 
Measure 
Based on the theoretical concept, we suggest including the cabinet level even 
more strongly. Given the importance of taking the coalition structure into ac-
count leads to the question of how concentrated the government will be (see 
Blau 2008, 168; Carey and Hix 2011, 387-8; Fisher and Hobolt 2010, 364). 
However, we still aim to measure party systems generally and not the singular 
governments to which they led under specific conditions. Precisely, we consid-
er the potential coalition size structures and what they imply for eventual gov-
ernment formation. In this way, we will be able to assess election outcomes’ 
implications for government formation by considering which coalition options 
become feasible after an election instead of only reporting the structure of the 
actual government. 
Staying in the well-established logic of NLT, we measure how fragmented a 
coalition government is in order to find out which type of coalition voters are 
confronted with. Specifically, investigating whether voters will be governed by 
a coalition which consists of one large party and one small partner or by a 
coalition without a clear leader (e.g. a grand coalition or a coalition of multiple 
                                                             
4  The normalized Banzhaf index-score Bzi of party i is calculated by dividing the amount of 
times this party is a swing voter in any of the winning coalitions, Swi, by the total amount 
of swing voters existing in all winning coalitions (see Banzhaf 1965): Bzi = 
Swi
∑ SwjNj=1
 . Having a 
swing means, that a party turns a winning coalition into a coalition without majority when 
leaving it. 
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small-to-moderately sized parties), we here apply the effective number of par-






with KC denoting the (pure) number of parties in coalition C and si(C) denoting 
the relative seat share of party i in coalition C.5 NLT(C) thus increases with the 
number of parties in a coalition, but also with the similarity of these parties’ 
sizes. For example, a senior-junior coalition of party A (holding .41 of the 
parliamentary seats) and party B (.1) would lead to NLT(C) = 1.46, while a 
grand coalition of two identically-sized partners would lead to NLT(C) = 2, and 
a multi-party coalition of A (.24), B (.19), and C (.16) to NLT(C) = 2.92. Obvi-
ously, NLT(C) = 1 for all single-party governments. 
We here use seat shares in order to approximate parties’ sizes. An alterna-
tive would be to estimate party sizes by their shares of cabinet posts within a 
government. This option might be more desirable from a theoretic standpoint 
(Blau 2008; Fisher and Hobolt 2010), but is not applicable practically since 
distributions of cabinet posts are only observable for actual governments but 
not for potential ones. As seat shares are a nearly perfect predictor for the share 
of portfolios (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006) a critique that seat 
shares are a substitute is only of little empirical relevance. 
Being interested in the question of how fragmented a coalition in a certain 
party system must at least be in order to hold a majority, we denote by 
NLT(C)min the effective number of parties in the most concentrated winning 
coalition: 
NLT(C)min = minCWC NLT(C). 
This new indicator for party system concentration conveys what is the mini-
mum effective number of parties within a government. 
Why do we not focus on actual governments formed (Carey and Hix 2011) 
but on the most concentrated coalition? Indeed, with a view to actual govern-
ment formation, considering only the minimal winning coalition with the low-
est effective number of parties may be highly misleading as, for example, ideo-
logical considerations might render this coalition unlikely. It is important to 
understand that, nevertheless, the focus on the most concentrated winning 
coalition leads to the more appropriate measure. Although we formally focus 
on one specific coalition in choosing the minimum NLT(C) value, this does not 
mean that we seek to predict the eventual government coalition. On the contra-
ry, the theoretical concept of party system concentration asks for the potential 
that a certain party system structure has for government formation, not for an 
explanation of why a certain government has formed including further varia-
                                                             
5  Formally, si(C)=si ∑ sjKCj=1
jC
൘  . 
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bles that are not or only partially influenced by electoral systems. The question, 
thus, is not how (coalition) governments did look like but how they could look 
like when assuming they need support of a majority in a specific parliament. 
The exclusion of further variables and the focus on the most concentrated gov-
ernment are therefore not shortcomings of our approach but necessary specifi-
cations in order to capture the concept optimally.6 
This approach to measuring the concentration dimension thus promises to 
provide us with more helpful and easily comprehensible information regarding 
which types of coalitions may form after an election and to fill this attention gap 
in the canon of party system concentration measures. In subjecting all here 
discussed indices measures to an in-depth assessment in light of the theoretical 
concept, the next section will assess the relative merits of different measures and 
especially investigate to what extent NLT(C)min is able to deliver on its promise. 
5.  Comparing Measures as to Their Conceptual Quality 
In the following, we will assess the conceptual quality of the different measures 
with regard to the demands as formulated in section 2. In a first step, we dis-
cuss the fulfillment of these demands rather from a theoretical standpoint but at 
the same time illustrate our arguments using an empirical application based on 
a large-n dataset (the parlgov dataset provided by Döring and Manow 2012) 
which includes complete results for all parties winning seats of 549 parliamen-
tary elections in 34 OECD countries. In a second step, we deepen the compari-
son by focusing on selected country cases – the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the Netherlands – which provide a broad sample of party systems covering 
polar and intermediate levels of party system concentration. With a rather con-
centrated (UK), an intermediate (Germany), and a fragmented (Netherlands) 
party system, we trace mechanisms of single indices and show that our newly 
                                                             
6  As an aside, with a conscious exclusion of variables beyond concentration like policy as-
pects, NLT(C)min is completely in line with hitherto existing indices. In a three-party system 
with parties of equal size, for example, neither NLT nor NBz ask whether or not all two-party 
combinations are likely, but just result in the number of 3. Apart from the theoretical argu-
ment, empirical applications show that NLT(C)min’s formal focus on one specific, the least 
fragmented, government option does not prevent it from supplying information about a 
party system’s concentration more generally. Further data analyses on the basis of the 
parlgov dataset (Döring and Manow 2012, see section 5) show that for cases in which no 
single-party majority ensues, the median difference between NLT(C)min and NLT(C) of the sec-
ond most concentrated coalition is a mere .05 with only ten percent of the cases leading to 
a difference higher than .28. Furthermore, there is virtually no correlation (r = .02) between 
NLT(C)min and the difference between NLT(C)min and NLT of the second most concentrated coa-
lition, meaning that the index is as reflective of multiple government options in fairly con-
centrated systems as it is in highly fragmented ones. 
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proposed index is better able to detect significant changes in party system de-
velopments than traditional indices are for most different cases.  
5.1  Theoretical Discussion and Illustration on the Basis of a Large-n 
Dataset 
5.1.1  Clear Identification of Cases with Single-Party Majorities 
We start the discussion of the indices’ conceptual quality with the question of 
whether or not they are clearly able to differentiate between the cases with 
single-party majorities and those without. For the sake of completeness, we 
shortly also refer to obviously overly simplistic measures like N and SPM. 
It is well-known already that NLT does not indicate single-party majorities 
with a clear value or range of values (e.g., Taagepera 1999; Golosov 2010). 
While NLT generally becomes smaller when party system concentration rises, it 
is easy to construct examples showing that the NLT value for a party constella-
tion with a single-party majority may be larger than the effective number of 
parties in a constellation where a coalition is needed to form a majority. For 
example, in a three-party system with the seat shares (.48, .47, .05), NLT = 2.20; 
in a six-party system (.54, .13, .11, .09, .07, .06), NLT = 2.97. Also the simple 
number of parties, N, by and large, increases in higher fragmented party sys-
tems. The same example shows that for N a clear cut point does not exist either. 
A computation of NG values for this example results in 2.16 for the three-party 
system without single-party majority and in 2.21 for the six-party system with. 
The conceptual similarity between NLT and NG, thus, is reflected by both indi-
ces’ disability to detect cases with single-party majorities. 
The remaining measures remedy this problem. This is obvious for the dum-
my variable SPM which takes the value of 1 by definition if a single party 
holds a majority and 0 if this is not the case. Also s1-1 clearly suggests when 
there is a single-party majority. This is the case once s1 is larger than .5 and 
thus s1-1 is below 2. Conversely, if the strongest party does not hold an absolute 
majority of the seats, s1 ≤ .5 and s1-1 ≥ 2.  
NBz and NLT(C)min share the property of taking on the value of 1 in cases with 
single-party majorities.7 Then, only one party is needed to form a winning 
government. Thus, this party is the only one getting a ‘swing point,’ whereas 
all other parties hold a Banzhaf value of 0. Applying the effective number of 
relevant parties to such a situation, this leads to NBz = 1. Conversely, NBz = 1 
can only occur if there is a single-party majority. If there is not, this means that 
at least one minimal winning coalition with at least two parties exists. As a 
consequence, at least these two parties get ‘swing points’ and, thus, NBz > 1. 
                                                             
7  For NBz see already Caulier and Dumont (2005). 
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Similarly, NLT(C)min = 1 if (and only if) one party holds an absolute majority. 
This party, then, may form a winning ‘coalition’ on its own, and NLT(C) equals 
1 for this coalition, what is also the possible minimum. On the other side, if 
there is no single-party majority, all winning coalitions include at least two 
parties with si > 0. Therefore, NLT(C) is larger than 1 for all these coalitions and 
hence the minimum, NLT(C)min, will be too. 
Thus, while SPM, s1-1, NBz, and also the newly introduced NLT(C)min all clear-
ly signal when the voter-government link is completely undistorted, N, NG, and 
the often used NLT measure are unable to clearly identify this polar case of full 
concentration. 
5.1.2  Omission of Meaningless Variation within Single-Party 
Majority Cases 
The second criterion which we formulated refers to variation within the single-
party majority cases. Since all these cases share the characteristic that the voter-
government link is fully undistorted, variance within these cases is meaningless 
in the sense of the concept and thus should be avoided. Furthermore, within-
group variation is problematic for technical reasons. Assume the existence of a 
cut point x that divides all cases in those with and those without single-party 
majorities, and assume further, without loss of generality, that the single-party 
majority cases are represented by values smaller or equal to x. If three party 
systems with index values x–2ε, x, and x+ε, are compared, obviously the first 
two are identical with respect to governance clarity, whereas this index would 
suggest a higher similarity of party systems 2 and 3. In particular, the usage of 
such an index in statistical analyses could therefore be highly misleading. 
We showed in section 5.1.1. that NBz and NLT(C)min take the value of 1 if and 
only if one party holds an absolute majority of the seats in a parliament. This 
means that there is no meaningless variation within this group for these two 
indices. Obviously, the same is true for the dummy indicator SPM. 
On the other hand, while s1-1 is able to clearly discriminate the cases with 
single-party majorities from the others, it is confronted with the problem of 
meaningless variation as it depends on the exact seat share of the strongest 
party. A lack of a clear cut point, as it is the case for N, NG, and NLT, automati-
cally results in variation within the single-party majority category, too. 
In order to illustrate this argumentation, we contrast results of those indices 
which do not vary within the single-party majority cases (NBz and NLT(C)min) 
with those that do (N, NG, NLT and s1-1).8 The results base on the parlgov dataset 
as described above. 
                                                             
8  We do not show results including the dummy variable SPM. 
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Notes: Summary statistics (549 cases) are the following: NLT: mean = 3.57 (standard deviation 
= 1.35); NG: 3.15 (1.37); NBz: 2.97 (1.64); N: 6.93 (3.28); s1-1: 2.56 (.83); NLT(C)min: 1.53 (.52). 
 
Figure 1 highlights the discussed structural differences empirically. The mean-
ingless variation can be detected where NBz and NLT(C)min equal 1. The respec-
tive vertical lines indicate that party systems with single-party majorities take 
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NLT values between 1.22 and 3.33. Strikingly, also one third (139 of 410) of the 
cases without single-party majorities lie in this range and thus cannot be sepa-
rated from the single-party majority cases with the help of NLT. Comparing the 
most fragmented (according to NLT) party system with a single-party majority 
(Lithuania after the 1996 elections) with the most concentrated (Malta in 1945), 
NLT would suggest that 496 party systems are more similar to Lithuania in 1996 
than Malta in 1945 was – including 358 of the 410 party systems (87.3 percent) 
without single-party majorities. Whereas these results might make sense re-
garding general party system patterns, they are highly misleading when it 
comes to the measurement of governance clarity. The empirical application 
underlines that meaningless variation is not a mere theoretical problem. 
Figure 1 shows that NG and N are confronted with this problem in a similar 
way but to different degrees. Whereas it is not surprising that we get almost no 
information about governance clarity from N, NG reduces the problems just 
discussed. Here, the vertical lines at NBz and NLT(C)min = 1 are shorter, i.e. the 
meaningless variation here is smaller compared to the whole index variation. 
Indeed, NG only ranges from 1.11 to 2.48 for single-party majority cases, and 
only 86 of the cases without single-party majorities take NG values within this 
range, too. However, NG likewise indicates a higher similarity between Lithua-
nia in 1996 and two thirds (274; 66.8 percent) of the cases without single-party 
majorities, than between Lithuania in 1996 and Malta in 1945.  
Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the hybrid character of s1-1. The value of 2 clear-
ly separates the party systems with single-party majorities from those without. 
As a consequence, no party system without a single-party majority can be 
found in the range between 1.11 (again Malta in 1945) and 1.99 (the United 
Kingdom after the elections of October 1974). However, searching for cases 
without single-party majorities and which s1-1 indicates as more similar to the 
case of the UK in October 1974 than Malta in 1945, we again find 259 such 
party systems, which is more than three fifths (63.2 percent) of the cases with-
out single party majorities.9 
5.1.3  Meaningful Variation for Party Systems without Single-Party 
Majorities 
Focusing on the third criterion, it is obvious that all indices but SPM provide 
variation for the cases without single-party majorities. This variation is already 
shown in the different panels of Figure 1. The important question, therefore, is 
                                                             
9  Of course, one could force such a measure to take on a common value for single-party 
majority cases (see Shugart 2001). Such a modified index is not confronted with the prob-
lem of meaningless variation for these cases. However, it still fails to capture differences 
between cases without full government clarity in a meaningful way, as we will show in sub-
section 5.1.3. 
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in which terms this variation is meaningful. Are the indices able to differentiate 
systemically between completely fragmented party systems in which only 
grand or multi-party coalitions own majorities, and moderately fragmented 
party systems in which still two-party senior-junior coalitions are possible? 
A further look at Figure 1 reveals that, apart from N, the indices highly cor-
relate with each other. While pairwise correlations including N lie between r = 
.48 (with NLT(C)min) and r = .64 (with NLT), the correlations excluding N range 
from r = .87 (NLT and NBz) to r = .98 (NG and s1-1). These high correlation values 
are misleading in the sense that one could believe that all indices but N evaluate 
the fragmentation of party systems more or less identically. Figure 1 shows that 
this is indeed true for highly fragmented party systems. On the other side, we 
see that different indices lead to different interpretations about which party 
systems come closest to the polar cases of single-party majorities. Most dis-
tinctly, this can be seen in the upper right panel where the cases cluster be-
tween NLT(C)min = 1 and 2. This observation is supported by correlation 
measures: While the correlation between NLT(C)min and NLT equals .92 for all 
cases, it goes down to .85 for the 499 more concentrated party systems with 
NLT(C)min ≤ 2 and further shrinks to .69 for the 292 cases with NLT(C)min ≤ 1.5. 
This means that, despite generally high correlations, the indices are not re-
placeable by each other. Since NLT(C)min is explicitly constructed in order to 
accurately capture party system differences with respect to possible cabinet 
fragmentation, this further demonstrates that the other indices are only partially 
able to accurately measure governance clarity. 
Two stylized examples of hypothetical party systems (Table 1) strengthen 
this argument. In the first example, a senior-junior coalition is still possible, 
namely that between the strongest and the third party, and no two-party win-
ning coalition can be formed against the strongest party. This party system can 
therefore be interpreted as one in which government clarity is at least partially 
given. On the contrary, in the second example each combination of two of the 
three strongest parties could form a winning coalition, so that the question of 
which parties are in the government depends more strongly on the parties’ 
negotiations there. Further, although a coalition between the strongest and the 
third party still is kind of senior-junior, the strongest party’s leadership is less 
distinct than in the first example, and the respective cabinet can be assumed to 
be more fragmented.  
Table 1: Index-Values for Stylized Examples 
Parliamentary seat shares N NLT NG NBz NLT(C)min s1-1
(.38, .36, .13, .11, .02) 5 3.30 3.04 3.76 1.61 2.63
(.45; .26; .25; .04) 4 2.99 2.47 3.00 1.85 2.22
 
The stylized example shows that the indices (partially) based on the parliamen-
tary level, N, NLT, NG, NBz and s1-1, fail to capture this argumentation. They all 
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suggest a lower level of fragmentation for the second example. However, 
NLT(C)min accurately indicates the latter scenario as more fragmented by focus-
ing on the cabinet level. Thus, NLT(C)min does not only clearly signal when there 
is a single-party majority (value equals 1) but also gives an indication as to how 
close to this polar situation the actual government can maximally come. Fur-
ther, for some cases it uncovers information which the other indices are unable 
to detect and therefore strongly adds to our understanding of the structure of 
the party systems. As an aside, even the supplement approach by Taagepera 
(1999, 502), hoping that the usage of both NLT and s1-1 balances out each other’s 
weaknesses, still fails to provide us with the needed information about the 
cabinet level as the examples in Table 1 show.10 
5.2   Three Illustrative Country Cases 
Next to an overall empirical discussion of the different measures and stylized 
examples such as those shown in Table 1, a complete assessment demands a 
closer look at important nuanced differences by considering specific, factual 
cases. Therefore, this sub-section seeks to deepen the comparison by focusing 
on the selected country cases of the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Neth-
erlands, which provide for a broad sample of party systems covering polar and 
intermediate levels of party system concentration. We show that our newly 
proposed index is better able to detect significant changes in party system de-
velopments between 1945 and 2010 than traditional indices. For the sake of 
parsimony, we from here on omit the overly simplistic measures N and SPM. 
Further, we do not continue discussing NG as this index is so closely related to 
NLT that all conclusions with respect to NLT can be read to also hold for NG with 
the only difference being that NG tends to report a slightly lower effective num-
ber of parties where one party is especially large. 
5.2.1  The United Kingdom 
The significant changes – from the electoral system perspective – to the party 
system of the United Kingdom occurred in 1974 (February) and in 2010, when 
the elections did not lead to single-party majorities but to ‘hung parliaments’ 
forcing coalition negotiations. As discussed in section 5.1, both NBz and 
NLT(C)min will clearly signal once a party system deviates from full concentra-
tion and thus do so for the British case (see Figure 2). While NLT each time 
suggests that the party system has become more fragmented compared to the 
last legislature, NLT does the same for, e.g., 1955, 1992, and 2005 where each 
                                                             
10  This is not meant to be a general critique. More general indices like NLT are highly appropriate 
to measure party system concentration from other perspectives such as an indicator of party 
system consolidation in new democracies (see, e.g., Olson 1998) or as a result of the impact 
of political cleavage structures (e.g., Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Coppedge 1997). 
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time a single-party majority existed. NLT also suggests higher levels of frag-
mentation after the 2005 election than after the 1974 (February) election, al-
though the voter-government link was distorted in 1974 but not in 2005. Fur-
thermore, NLT suggests no change between the two elections in 1974 whereas 
the October election actually provided a single-party majority and thus marked 
a tremendous development from the standpoint of the theoretical concept. 
Figure 2: Different Indices for the United Kingdom 
 
 
While able to signal full concentration, looking at specific elections highlights 
how the NBz measure is prone to overestimate the diminishing effect on party 
system concentration caused by the presence of small parties. The spikes in 
Figure 2 emphasize that NBz often suggests very low levels of concentration 
where actually one party has received a large bulk of seats and is able to govern 
with very little additional support due to the presence of multiple potential 
junior partners. In this rather extreme tendency, NBz actually suggests a full 
breakdown of concentration in 1974 (February) and in 2010, making the UK 
party system seem similar to that of the Netherlands (see Figure 4) although 
each time the largest party held close to 50 percent of the seats and could gov-
ern in a senior-junior coalition.  
This structural aspect is accurately and clearly reflected by NLT(C)min and s1-1 
which each signal only a minor but important change to the party system with 
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change to a hung parliament but also signal that there is potential for a rather 
lopsided senior-junior coalition government. For the UK case, s1-1’s ignorance 
towards all parties except the largest does not lead to a problematic empirical 
performance as indeed in each case where there was no single-party majority, a 
relatively small partner was available to form a government. However, the UK 
case does highlight that with respect to the concept of party system concentra-
tion s1-1 suggests variation where no meaningful changes occur (e.g., between 
2001 and 2005, s1-1 varies while each time a single-party majority exists). Such 
non-meaningful variation can be especially misleading if one compares chang-
es in s1-1 without considering the majority-threshold: one could, for example, 
believe that the British party system changed more between 1945 and 1950 
than between 1970 and 1974 (February) by looking at absolute changes. From 
an electoral system perspective, quite the opposite is true. 
5.2.2   Germany 
As regards the German party system as a moderately fragmented case, major 
changes to be considered are the development from a multiparty to a three-
party system between 1949 and 1961, a stable phase with two larger and one 
smaller party until 1983 and the electoral success of two further parties thereaf-
ter. Special cases regarding party system concentration are the single-party 
majority of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) in 1957 as well as the party 
system after the 2005 election which made any two-party senior-junior coali-
tion impossible for the first time since 1949 (see Figure 3). 
First, while all measures are able to capture the dramatic increase in concen-
tration following the first election in 1949, NLT again fails to identify the pres-
ence of a single-party majority in 1957 and cannot distinguish that election 
from those between 1969 and 1976. Second, NBz highlights the stability of the 
amount of coalition viable parties between 1961 and 2002. Yet, in neglecting 
size structure, NBz fails to recognize crucial developments regarding the type of 
coalition government in suggesting a constant level of concentration. For in-
stance, it is unable to distinguish between the 2009 and, for example, the 1969 
elections where s1-1 and NLT(C)min highlight that the largest party needed con-
siderably more support in 2009. Third, considering the important change of 
coalition structure in 2005, Figure 3 shows that while NLT suggests less concen-
tration in 2009, s1-1 and, even more so, NLT(C)min and NBz suggest otherwise and 
thus are able to capture the increase in party system concentration based on 
coalition structure. 
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Figure 3: Different Indices for (West) Germany 
 
 
Finally, Figure 3 also shows the subtle but important differences between 
NLT(C)min and s1-1. The development of the German party system between 1961 
and 1969 highlights how s1-1 might miss important developments concerning 
coalition structure by taking into account only the largest party. In this period, 
the Free Democrats (FDP) went from holding 13.4 percent of the seats in 1961 
to only 6 percent in 1969 – while the stability of the s1-1 scores suggests that the 
largest party in each case would only need a rather small partner to form a 
winning coalition, the decrease of NLT(C)min conveys that the best-case senior-
junior coalition became more and more lopsided over time. Furthermore, the 
relative stability of s1-1 and the increase of NLT from 2005 to 2009 highlight that 
a failure of the supplement-approach is not merely a theoretical problem – this 
approach would not capture the important development of coalition possibili-
ties while NLT(C)min does. 
5.2.3   The Netherlands 
The Dutch party system has always been rather fragmented and multiparty 
coalitions have been the norm. The entrance of new parties (especially during 
the 1960s) as well as party-mergers (e.g. the Christian Democratic parties KVP, 
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overall structure of the party system. In 2010, five parties were each holding 
between 10 and 20.7 percent of the seats. 
Figure 4: Different Indices for the Netherlands 
 
 
Figure 4 shows how the different measures disagree as regards the early devel-
opment of the party system: between 1946 and 1967, NLT(C)min suggests high 
stability of party system concentration, while NLT and NBz show that the effec-
tive number of (relevant) parties varied widely on the parliamentary level. s1-1 
highlights variation with regard to the largest party. While during this 
timeframe the party system became more fragmented (as captured especially by 
NLT), the coalition structure basically remained stable: from 1946 to 1967 a 
winning coalition would have either had to include the two largest parties or 
needed multiple at least moderately sized parties and thus a high level of gov-
ernment-fragmentation was necessary in each case. For example, in 1956 the 
most concentrated winning coalition would have been a PvdA-KVP grand 
coalition (NLT(PvdA-KVP) = NLT(C)min = 2), the second most concentrated 
coalition option would have been a PvdA-led four-party coalition consisting of 
2.02 effective government parties. Similarly, in 1963 a KVP-PvdA grand coali-
tion would have been the most concentrated option (NLT(KVP-PvdA) = 1.99) 
with the second most concentrated option being a five-party coalition this time 
being led by the KVP and consisting of 2.02 effective government-parties. 
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is not based solely on grand coalitions usually consisting of about two effective 
parties. It again shows, in contrast, that NLT(C)min does not strongly depend on 
one certain – maybe unrealistic – potential coalition but captures the fragmen-
tation structure of potential coalition governments more generally. 
The situation of the party system moderately changed in 1971 which marked 
the first election where a coalition between the two largest parties was not 
possible anymore (the Social Democrats [PvdA] and the KVP combined for 
only 49.3 percent of the seats). Thus, in light of the theoretical concept, 
NLT(C)min signaling stagnation with respect to party system concentration seems 
warranted in this case and enables the researcher to clearly detect changes to 
the cabinet level such as that from 1967 to 1971. On the contrary, the other 
indices signal a more pronounced change from 1963 to 1967 whereas the coali-
tion structure hardly differed. Obviously, as regards the pool of potential gov-
ernment parties, NLT and NBz clearly signal changes to this pool while NLT(C)min 
(especially before 1977) clusters at the 2-mark suggesting that even the ideal 
scenario would lead to a low level of concentration on the cabinet level. 
After this period, all measures capture the important changes of the concen-
tration of the Dutch party system in 1977.11 There is another (minor) disagree-
ment between measures going from the 1981 to the 1982 election: while NLT 
and NBz suggest an increase in party system concentration, s1-1 and NLT(C)min 
signal the opposite. Here, the former measures react to the success of the VVD 
(24 percent) which joined the PvdA (31.3) and the CDA (30) as a third major 
party and the relative decline of the liberal D66 (11.3 in 1981 vs. 4 in 1982). 
Yet, the latter measures signal no meaningful change as the largest party (or the 
second largest, for that matter) would still need the support of an almost equal 
sized or multiple moderately to small sized partners. After 1982, then, all 
measures are very much in agreement about the development of the party system. 
6.  Conclusion 
Crucially, the electoral system perspective shifts our attention to the cabinet 
level and highlights the importance of coalition structure. The above investiga-
tion illustrates that with measuring concentration accurately the devil is in the 
detail. In our theoretical part, we elaborated three demands which an index 
should satisfy in order to accurately measure party system concentration from 
an electoral system researcher’s perspective. While indices like NLT and NG are 
able to paint clear pictures of the parliamentary level, they lose much of their 
viability as one tries to make inferences about the possible structure of the 
                                                             
11  The 1977 election marked the first postwar election in which it became at least possible for 
a larger party to govern alongside a considerably smaller partner as the PvdA (35.3 percent) 
or the CDA (32.7) could have reached a majority via the support of the liberal VVD (18.7). 
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ensuing government. Table 2 summarizes in how far the indices under research 
in this paper fulfill our demands and shows that only our newly introduced 
measure NLT(C)min meets all three demands.  
Strikingly, the well-established NLT measure fails to satisfy any of the crite-
ria. In terms of a substantial interpretation, it is often unclear what a decrease in 
NLT actually implies for the cabinet level and thus for the directness of the 
voter-government link. The same is true for related indices like NG. NBz espe-
cially suffers from largely neglecting parties’ relative sizes. Therefore, a shift 
in NBz does not convey much information as to how the government may look 
like based on the election outcomes and, as the UK example highlights, NBz 
may exaggerate developments of concentration. 
Table 2: Summary of the Key Results 








within the cases  
without  
single-party majorities 
N no no no
NLT no no no
NG no no no
NBz yes yes no
NLT(C)min yes yes yes
SPM yes yes no
s1-1 yes no no
 
While, as expected, the simplistic N is useless in the light of the theoretical 
concept, the even simpler SPM meets at least two of three demands. However, 
it importantly misses to differentiate between moderately and totally fragment-
ed party systems. The meant-to-be supplement s1-1, on the other hand, is clearly 
able to identify single-party majority cases but is not helpful regarding the 
further criteria.  
NLT(C)min’s properties have shown to be well-suited for measuring party sys-
tem concentration. The index could be shown to fulfill the demand of capturing 
key developments within party systems by distinguishing between polar (sin-
gle-party majorities, highly fragmented governments) and intermediate (senior-
junior coalitions) levels of concentration. NLT(C)min reports the best concentra-
tion level attainable, distinguishing clearly between types of coalitions, and 
assigns the same value to all cases of full concentration. Thinking about voters 
trying to ascribe responsibility, NLT(C)min yields the minimum number of hypo-
thetical equal-sized parties which voters have to consider when assigning re-
sponsibility to parties and evaluating the government. In sum, we advocate 
moving away from the almost universal application of NLT and suggest using 
NLT(C)min for measuring party system concentration when evaluating electoral 
systems, as NLT(C)min’s focus on the cabinet level renders it more apt to also 
identify more nuanced differences between intermediate levels of concentration. 
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For electoral system research, the potential advantages of applying a cabi-
net-focused measurement approach are quite clear. For a more nuanced under-
standing and evaluation of institutions such as electoral systems trying to bal-
ance competing demands of representation and concentration, taking coalition 
structure into account should yield a clearer picture of how such systems per-
form with respect to both key dimensions of electoral systems. Furthermore, by 
capturing crucial developments which go beyond the simple distinction be-
tween single-party majorities and highly fragmented systems, the proposed 
measurement approach could also help to increase the precision of analyses of, 
for example, government stability based on party system concentration (see 
also Somer-Topcu and Williams 2008). 
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